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CEO Overconfidence and Stock Price Crash Risk 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
This study examines the association between chief executive officer (CEO) overconfidence and 
future stock price crash risk. Overconfident managers overestimate the returns to their 
investment projects and misperceive negative net present value (NPV) projects as value creating. 
They also tend to ignore or explain away privately observed negative feedback. As a result, 
negative NPV projects are kept for too long and their bad performance accumulates, which can 
lead to stock price crashes. Using a large sample of firms for the period 1993–2010, we find that 
firms with overconfident CEOs have higher stock price crash risk than firms with non-
overconfident CEOs. The impact of managerial overconfidence on crash risk is more pronounced 
when the CEO is more dominant in the top management team and when there are greater 
differences of opinion among investors. Finally, it appears that the effect of CEO overconfidence 
on crash risk is less pronounced for firms with more conservative accounting policies. 
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1. Introduction 
In this paper, we propose and test a new explanation for managerial bad news hoarding 
behavior and the resultant stock price crashes. Rather than focus on firm-level characteristics that 
encourage adverse but rational incentives (e.g., Jin and Mayers 2006; Kothari et al. 2009), we 
investigate whether stock price crashes can be explained by executives’ characteristics or 
psychological traits. Specifically, we focus on the impact of overconfidence, or overoptimism, 
defined as the tendency of individuals to overestimate their own acumen, mastery, and prospects 
for positive future outcomes. Prior literature finds that overconfidence is a strong and robust 
psychological trait across many samples of subjects, especially among top executives (Alicke 
and Govorun 2005; Graham et al. 2013; Moore and Healy 2008; Taylor and Brown 1988; 
Weinstein 1980). Thus, it is important to understand the real impact of managerial 
overconfidence on investor welfare, as reflected by stock price crashes. 
Overconfident managers tend to overestimate the future cash flows of their investment 
projects, as well as their own ability to bring about good performance (Heaton 2002; Malmendier 
and Tate 2005, 2008; Malmendier et al. 2011). As a result, they tend to misperceive ongoing 
negative NPV projects as value creating. They also cannot rationally process negative feedback 
about the projects they operate (Taylor and Brown 1988; Taylor and Gollwitzer 1995). Upon 
observing negative feedback, a rational CEO revises her expectation downward and may 
conclude that the projects are of negative NPV ex post, whereas an overconfident CEO fails to 
do so. Instead, the overconfident CEO tends to ignore negative feedback and still believes that 
the projects have a promising future. Moreover, the overconfident CEO who handpicks the 
investment projects believes that he has the ability to control their outcome and underestimates 
the likelihood of failure (Malmendier and Tate 2005). These manifestations of overconfidence 
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lead the CEO to continue the negative NPV projects for extended periods. The poor performance 
of these bad projects will accumulate and eventually materialize at their final maturity, leading to 
a market crash of the stock price. 
Overconfidence also affects managers’ supply of financial information to the stock 
market. Because overconfident CEOs erroneously perceive poorly performing negative NPV 
projects as positive NPV projects, they can be reluctant to release privately observed negative 
feedback about the projects. This is because overconfident CEOs believe that impatient investors, 
who tend to act on short-term news, can force the termination of positive NPV projects that 
deliver negative interim news. Such CEOs may even use positive accounting accruals and 
voluntary disclosure to convey their (genuine yet flawed) optimistic beliefs about the firms’ 
long-term prospects to the stock market. Thus, CEO overconfidence can lead to bad news 
hoarding, which in turn leads to future stock price crashes.1 
To examine the relation between CEO overconfidence and crash risk, we use several 
proxies for overconfidence. First, we construct a modified version of the Malmendier–Tate (2005) 
stock option-based overconfidence measure, following the methodology of Campbell et al. 
(2011). This measure captures the propensity for a manager to voluntarily retain in-the-money 
stock options after the vesting period. A CEO who voluntarily retains in-the-money options is 
likely to be overconfident about his own ability and the firm’s prospects because the CEO’s 
human capital is already highly exposed to firm-specific risk. Second, following Campbell et al. 
(2011) and Schrand and Zechman (2012), we construct two additional overconfidence measures 
by inferring managers’ optimism from their various investing and financing decisions. Finally, 
                                                            
1 It is important to emphasize that we are not arguing that the hiding of bad news is driven only by managerial 
overconfidence and not by conflicts of interest. Instead, we explore a potentially complementary theory of 
managerial behaviors and stock price crashes. Our point is that even if there is no conflict of interest, bad news 
hoarding can still happen because of overconfidence. 
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for robustness tests, we construct the exact Malmendier–Tate overconfidence measure, using a 
reduced sample of CEOs with package-level option holdings data from ExecuComp 
(Malmendier et al. 2011). Following Chen et al. (2001) and Hutton et al. (2009), we measure 
firm-specific crash risk by the probability of extreme negative firm-specific weekly returns, the 
negative skewness of firm-specific weekly returns, and the asymmetric volatility of negative 
versus positive firm-specific weekly returns. 
Using a large sample of firms in Standard & Poor’s (S&P) ExecuComp database for the 
period 1993–2010, we find that firms with overconfident CEOs are more likely to experience 
firm-specific stock price crashes in the future, consistent with our prediction. The results are 
strong and robust across different measures of overconfidence and crash risk. Moreover, using a 
smaller sample of firms with CEO changes, we find evidence that changes in overconfidence 
resulting from CEO turnover are positively related to changes in future crash risk. 
We next explore several potential moderating effects on the relation between 
overconfidence and crash risk. First, prior organizational theory suggests that the influence of a 
CEO’s judgment errors on final decision outcomes should be greater when the decision-making 
power is more centralized in the hands of the CEO (Adams et al. 2005; Sah and Stiglitz 1986, 
1991). Consistent with this theory, we show that the impact of CEO overconfidence on crash risk 
is stronger for firms with more dominant CEOs, as proxied by a larger CEO pay slice (CPS). 
Second, we argue that overconfident managers may feel less of a need to address the concerns of 
bearish investors when there are greater differences of opinion among investors. As a result, 
investors’ differences of opinion can exacerbate the effect of overconfidence on crash risk. 
Consistent with this argument, we show that the relation between overconfidence and crash risk 
is mainly driven by firms with greater differences of opinion among investors. Finally, Kim and 
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Zhang (2015) show that accounting conservatism reduces crash risk by recognizing bad news in 
a more timely fashion. Consistent with this finding, we find that the impact of CEO 
overconfidence on crash risk is more pronounced for firms with less conservative accounting 
policies. 
Our study relates to several strands of literature. First, we contribute to the literature on 
explanations for stock price crashes. Using a traditional agency theory framework, a growing 
body of recent theoretical and empirical research has identified a variety of firm characteristics 
that are determinants or precursors of stock price crashes (Benmelech et al. 2010; Bleck and Liu 
2007; DeFond et al. 2015; Hutton et al. 2009; Jin and Myers 2006; Kim et al. 2011a, 2011b; Kim 
and Zhang 2015). Our study is the first to examine the impact of managerial personal traits on 
crash risk. We provide evidence that a benevolent but overconfident CEO can contribute to firm-
specific crashes. Overconfident managers may well think that they are maximizing long-term 
shareholder value by continuing negative NPV projects and hiding negative feedback, because 
they cannot rationally evaluate the intrinsic value of the ongoing projects. This argument is in 
stark contrast to traditional theories that assume that managers are able to rationally observe the 
intrinsic value of investment projects at any point in time and that they choose to hide bad news 
to achieve private benefits (e.g., Bleck and Liu 2007). Thus our study constitutes an important 
complement to the traditional agency theory of bad news hoarding and stock price crashes by 
providing a related but fundamentally different explanation. 
Second, our study relates to the emerging literature of behavioral corporate finance that 
examines the impact of managerial psychological traits, such as overconfidence, on various 
corporate policies and outcomes. Our study extends this line of research by examining the impact 
of CEO overconfidence on stock price crashes, the incidence of which often has a devastating 
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impact on investor welfare. Our research is closely related to those of Schrand and Zechman 
(2012) and Ahmed and Duellman (2013), who link managerial overconfidence to accounting 
manipulation and conservatism. However, our research provides additional insights into this 
literature because financial reporting quality is only one of many potential channels through 
which overconfidence affects crash risk (Hutton et al. 2009; Kim and Zhang 2015). For instance, 
one of our main arguments is that overconfident managers tend to stick to negative NPV projects 
for extended periods, leading to stock price crashes. As expected, we show that all of our results 
hold after controlling for accrual management and accounting conservatism, suggesting a direct 
impact of overconfidence on crash risk. Therefore, we argue that the findings of this study 
represent an important complement to the prior literature on overconfidence and accounting 
quality. 
Finally, our study is related to a broader literature that examines the impact of managerial 
styles on firm behavior and performance. The key argument of this literature is that the 
individual manager matters for corporate decisions, in addition to firm-, industry-, and market-
level characteristics. For example, the seminal paper by Bertrand and Schoar (2003) shows that 
individual managers affect corporate investment, financing, and organizational practices. We 
contribute to this literature by showing that one type of managerial style (i.e., overconfidence) 
can explain firm-specific stock price crash risk. 
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature and develops our 
hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and explains the measurement of key variables. Section 
4 presents the main empirical analysis. Section 5 conducts several cross-sectional analyses. 
Section 6 provides robustness checks and additional tests. Section 7 concludes the paper. 
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2. Related literature and empirical predictions 
Financial economists have long been interested in stock price crashes or the negative 
skewness in stock returns. Earlier explanations for the sources of negative skewness focus on 
financial market mechanisms such as leverage effects, volatility feedback, and stochastic bubbles. 
While those studies build their models in a representative investor framework, a more recent 
study by Hong and Stein (2003) shows that investor heterogeneity is central to the phenomenon. 
Specifically, the authors argue that when differences of opinion among investors are initially 
large, bearish investors with unfavorable news who are subject to short-selling constraints will be 
forced into a corner solution; that is, they will sell all their shares and just sit out of the market. 
As a result, their information is not fully incorporated into share prices. The Hong–Stein model 
then shows that the accumulated hidden information tends to come out during market declines, 
resulting in large negative return outliers. Consistent with Hong and Stein (2003), Chen et al. 
(2001) provide empirical evidence that differences of opinion among investors are positively 
related to crash risk. 
In contrast to financial market theories focusing on the investor side, recent corporate 
finance theories have begun to explore the firm side of the story for stock price crashes in an 
agency theory framework. Jin and Myers (2006) argue that opacity combined with limited 
investor protection enables a manager to capture part of a firm’s operating cash flows. In the 
process, the manager absorbs and hides firm-specific bad news to protect his or her job. However, 
the amount of bad news that the manager is willing or able to absorb is limited. If a sufficiently 
long run of bad news is encountered, the manager exercises the abandonment option and releases 
the accumulated bad news all at once, resulting in a large negative firm-specific return outlier. 
Consistent with the prediction of Jin and Mayers (2006), Hutton et al. (2009) and Kim et al. 
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(2011b) show that opaqueness engendered by earnings management and complex tax planning 
facilitates managerial bad news hoarding and increases crash risk. In the same vein, DeFond et al. 
(2015) and Kim and Zhang (2015) show that International Financial Reporting Standards and 
accounting conservatism increase transparency and reduce crash risk. 
Bleck and Liu (2007) offer a related but slightly different explanation for stock price 
crashes. They argue that the manager has an incentive to keep a bad project as long as possible to 
derive private benefits from it for longer periods. The manager is also able to do so because he or 
she can hide the project’s poor performance under a historical cost accounting regime. The poor 
performance of the bad project can thus accumulate and only eventually materialize at its final 
maturity, resulting in a price crash. More recently, Benmelech et al. (2010) explicitly address the 
adverse incentives created by stock-based compensation. They argue that the extent of stock-
based compensation induces CEOs to willingly drive stock prices up by hiding bad news about 
their firms’ long-term growth. To keep the pretense of high growth, the CEOs overinvest, which 
eventually leads to undercapitalization and a stock price crash. Consistent with Benmelech et al. 
(2010), Kim et al. (2011a) show that managerial equity incentives are positively related to crash 
risk. 
A common point of departure of the above traditional corporate finance explanations for 
stock price crashes is the notion that managers are homo economicus and that there is conflict of 
interest between managers and outside investors. In other words, these studies assume that 
managers can make rational and accurate judgments about a firm’s intrinsic value and future 
growth options at any point in time. Because of bad incentives, managers knowingly keep bad 
projects and hide bad performance to benefit themselves at the expense of shareholders. 
However,  
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A fundamental idea in social psychology is that people do not only want to make money 
– they also want to feel good about themselves, and it is hard to feel good about oneself if 
one is knowingly doing something that is potentially ruinous to others (Barberis 2011: 7)  
In addition, the economics and psychology literature suggests that people do not always 
gather data and form beliefs in an unbiased manner, nor do they always reach accurate inferences 
and decisions based on a given set of data and beliefs (Baker et al. 2007; Barberis and Thaler 
2003; Baker and Wurgler 2012; Nisbett and Ross 1980). Therefore we argue that traditional 
agency theory explanations for stock price crashes are likely to be incomplete. 
This study seeks to complement prior crash theories by examining an alternative, 
psychologically founded explanation for managerial bad news hoarding and stock price crashes. 
Considerable evidence in the social psychology literature suggests that people have overly 
positive self-evaluations (i.e., the better-than-average effect), exaggerated perception of control, 
and unrealistic optimism about the future (for reviews, see Alicke and Govorun 2005; Moore and 
Healy 2008; Taylor and Brown 1988). This set of interrelated positive illusions is often called 
overconfidence in the behavioral economics and finance literature. 2  Prior literature has 
confirmed overconfidence or overoptimism in the thoughts of corporate managers and 
entrepreneurs (Ben-David et al. 2010; Camerer and Lovallo 1999). In fact, Graham et al. (2013) 
find that overconfidence is more prevalent among CEOs than in the general population. This 
finding is not surprising, given the theoretical result of Goel and Thakor (2008), that 
overconfident managers are more likely to be promoted to CEOs than rational managers are. 
Recent behavioral corporate finance literature links CEO overconfidence to lower investment 
                                                            
2 In the psychology literature, overconfidence sometimes specially refers to the overestimation of the accuracy of 
one’s belief (i.e., underestimation of variance). However, we argue that this overestimation of accuracy can also be 
cast within a framework of positive illusions, because it can be seen as an overestimation of one’s judgment skills. 
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efficiency (Ben-David et al. 2010; Malmendier and Tate 2005), higher investment in innovation 
(Galasso and Simcoe 2011; Hirshleifer et al. 2012), more value-destroying mergers (Ferris et al. 
2012; Malmendier and Tate 2008; Roll 1986), more optimistic earnings forecasts (Hilary and 
Hsu 2011; Hribar and Yang 2014), a higher incidence of accounting fraud and lower accounting 
conservatism (Ahmed and Duellman 2013; Schrand and Zechman 2012), a higher level of short-
term debt (Graham et al. 2013), and less use of external finance (Malmendier et al. 2011). 
Overall, this nascent and fast-growing literature provides useful insights into important corporate 
phenomena that have been traditionally explained by more established agency theories. 
In this study, we posit that CEO overconfidence is positively related to stock price crash 
risk. It is important to first stress that our hypothesis does not depend on the existence of any 
rational moral hazard behavior, such as empire building, stealing, or other types of private 
interest seeking. Instead, we are concerned with situations where the interests of the manager and 
outside investors are perfectly aligned. Overconfident managers, being highly committed to their 
investment projects, tend to misperceive ex post negative NPV projects as value creating. As a 
result, they are more likely to stick to money-losing projects that rational managers would 
terminate. Keeping negative NPV projects for extended periods in turn leads to asset price 
crashes. This argument bears some resemblance to the model of Bleck and Liu (2007); however, 
there is a fundamental difference: In our theory, overconfident managers overestimate the future 
cash flows of ongoing (negative NPV) projects and simply think that they are acting in the best 
interest of shareholders by continuing them. In contrast, in the Bleck–Liu model, managers are 
rational, in the sense that they have unbiased estimates of the projects’ intrinsic value and keep 
the bad projects to derive more private benefits. 
The social psychology literature also suggests that overconfident people suffer from so-
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called interpretational bias: Negative feedback is more likely to be perceived as inaccurate or 
uninformative than positive feedback. As a result, negative feedback is often explained away or 
ignored (Markus 1977; Snyder et al. 1977; Swann and Read 1981). Taylor and Brown (1988) 
argue that this cognitive bias may be somewhat necessary to maintain overconfidence as a stable 
psychological trait. In addition, Taylor and Gollwitzer (1995) show that individuals in the post-
decisional phase are more vulnerable to interpretational bias (as well as other positive illusions) 
than those in the pre-decisional phase. In the corporate setting, this means that overconfident 
CEOs are more likely to ignore negative feedback when they are in the process of operating the 
selected investment projects than when they are in the stage of choosing between potential 
projects. This interpretational bias, together with illusions that they can control the situation, 
hinders overconfident CEOs from rationally updating their beliefs in the face of negative 
feedback and thus leads them to persevere at negative NPV projects for extended periods. 
Finally, interpretational bias and other positive illusions of overconfident CEOs also 
affect their supply of financial information to the stock market. Since overconfident CEOs tend 
to (unconsciously) exclude privately observed negative feedback from their minds, they also 
naturally ignore such information when they communicate with shareholders regarding firm 
performance. Moreover, to prevent the intervention of impatient investors, they may also 
consciously shift the reported information in a rosier direction to convince investors that their 
ongoing projects have a promising future. Thus CEO overconfidence can lead to bad news 
hoarding behavior, which increases crash risk. The bad news hoarding behavior here is different 
from that in the Jin–Myers model, in that overconfident CEOs believe (irrationally) that they are 
conveying the firm’s true performance to investors and are maximizing long-term firm value by 
doing so. In contrast, the assumption of the Jin–Myers model is that managers have incentives to 
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capture more cash flows than the necessary compensation for their firm-specific human capital. 
In fact, Jin and Myers (2006) argue that opaqueness does not increase crash likelihood if the 
opaque firm is run by a saintly manager who always acts in the shareholders’ interest and never 
takes a dollar more or less than deserved. 
3. Data and variable measurement 
Data 
The sample for our main analysis is based on all CEO–firm–years in the ExecuComp 
database between 1993 and 2010. This database covers S&P 1500 Index companies and 
companies that were once part of the S&P 1500 Index. To compute the main CEO 
overconfidence indicator, we further require that CEO option holdings data be available from 
ExecuComp. We then delete observations with missing Compustat accounting data and missing 
Center for Research in Security Prices stock price, return, and trading volume data in estimating 
our crash risk measures and control variables. We also remove firms with a year-end share price 
that is lower than $1. The main sample includes 17,568 firm–year observations. Our second and 
third CEO overconfidence indicators require additional Compustat data items. Thus the number 
of observations for the regression specifications with the second or third overconfidence measure 
is reduced to 16,229. 
Measuring overconfidence 
Our main measure of overconfidence is a stock option-based indicator constructed 
following the spirit of Malmendier and Tate (2005). This measure uses the timing of option 
exercises to identify CEO overconfidence. Typically, CEOs are highly exposed to the 
idiosyncratic risk of their firms because the value of their human capital is intimately linked to 
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firm performance. Thus it is generally optimal for risk-averse, undiversified CEOs to exercise 
their own firms’ stock options early if the options are sufficiently in the money (Hall and 
Murphy 2002). However, Malmendier and Tate (2005) find that a subset of CEOs in their data 
persistently fails to do so. The authors argue that overconfidence induces these CEOs to 
postpone option exercise because they overestimate the future returns of their investment 
projects. Moreover, the authors carefully rule out the alternative inside information-based 
explanation of late exercise by showing that CEOs who hold excessive company stock options 
do not earn significant abnormal returns over the S&P 500 Index. 
Malmendier and Tate (2005) define CEOs as overconfident if they hold options at least 
twice during the sample period that are more than 67% in the money. Since we do not have the 
detailed package-level data of Malmendier and Tate (2005) for our large sample of CEOs, we 
use a modified version of their overconfidence measure, as developed by Campbell et al. 
(2011).3 Specifically, we estimate the average CEO stock option moneyness for each year as 
follows. First, we compute the realizable value per option as the total realizable value of the 
exercisable options divided by the total number of exercisable options. Second, we estimate the 
average exercise price of the options by subtracting the realizable value per option from the stock 
price at the fiscal year-end. Finally, the average percent moneyness of the options is calculated as 
the per-option realizable value divided by the estimated average exercise price. 
Campbell et al. (2011) argue that the harmful effects of overconfidence are likely driven 
by the subset of CEOs with relatively high levels of overconfidence. Since our study is about one 
potential harmful effect, being classified as an overconfident CEO, we require that the CEOs 
                                                            
3 Detailed package-level option holdings data became available in ExecuComp after fiscal year 2006. For a smaller 
sample of firm–years after 2006, we estimate the original measure of Malmendier and Tate (2005) and find that all 
of our main results hold.  
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hold stock options at least twice during our sample period that are more than 100% in the 
money.4 Following Campbell et al. (2011), our first measure of overconfidence, OC_CJRS, takes 
the value of one beginning with the first time the CEO exhibits the above option-holding 
behavior and zero otherwise. 
The second overconfidence measure we use is the firm-specific score developed by 
Schrand and Zechman (2012). The idea is that overconfident CEOs are consistently optimistic 
across different decision contexts because overconfidence is supposed to be a persistent trait. 
Thus we can infer the CEO’s overconfidence level from their various investing and financing 
decisions. Specifically, the second overconfidence measure, OC_SZ, takes the value of one if the 
firm meets at least three of the following five criteria and zero otherwise: (1) Excess investment 
is in the top quartile of firms within industry–years, where excess investment is the residual from 
a regression of total asset growth on sales growth; (2) Net acquisitions from the statement of cash 
flows are in the top quartile of firms within industry–years; (3) The debt-to-equity ratio is in the 
top quartile of firms within industry–years, where the debt-to-equity ratio is defined as long-term 
plus short-term debt divided by total market value; (4) Either convertible debt or preferred stock 
is greater than zero; (5) The dividend yield is zero. These criteria are based on prior research that 
overconfident CEOs are more likely to overinvest, more likely to overpay and to engage in 
value-destroying acquisitions, more likely to use debt than equity, more likely to use risky debt 
of longer duration, and less likely to pay dividends. Schrand and Zechman (2012) use the 
industry median as a benchmark in criteria (1) to (3), whereas we use the top quartile benchmark 
                                                            
4 All the empirical results hold if we use the 67% threshold. As expected, the results are weaker but remain very 
significant. 
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to capture high levels of overconfidence.5 Following Schrand and Zechman (2012), the industry 
is defined as a three-digit Standard Industrial Classification code. 
The Schrand–Zechman (2012) measure is a firm-level measure of overconfidence. 
Campbell et al. (2011) use a similar CEO-level measure of overconfidence based solely on firm 
investment decisions. Following the spirit of Campbell et al., we also convert the OC_SZ 
measure into a CEO-level measure. Specifically, our third measure of overconfidence, denoted 
OC_MSZ, takes the value of one beginning with the first time the CEO’s firm has an OC_SZ 
score equal to one. All our results are replicated if we use exactly the same investment level-
based measure of overconfidence as that of Campbell et al. (2011). 
Measuring stock price crash risk 
Following Hutton et al. (2009) and Kim et al. (2011a, b), we first estimate the firm-
specific weekly returns for each firm and year because we are interested in firm-specific return 
crashes. Specifically, the firm-specific weekly return, denoted W, is defined as the natural log of 
one plus the residual return from the expanded index model regression 
         
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
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2,101,9,81,72,6
2,51,4,31,22,1,
,                           (1)
 
where ,jr  is the return on stock j in week  , ,mr  is the return on the Center for Research in 
Security Prices value-weighted market index in week  , and ,ir  is the return on the Fama–
French value-weighted industry index in week  . We include the lead and lag terms for the 
market and industry indexes to allow for nonsynchronous trading (Dimson 1979). The firm-
                                                            
5 All the results are robust if we use industry median as the benchmark. 
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specific weekly return for firm j in week  , ,jW , is measured by the natural log of one plus the 
residual return in Eq. (1), that is, )1ln( .,   jjW  . To estimate Eq. (1), we require that at least 
26 weekly return observations be available for each firm and year. 
We define crash weeks in a given fiscal year for a given firm as those weeks during 
which the firm experiences firm-specific weekly returns that fall more than 3.2 standard 
deviations below the mean firm-specific weekly returns over the entire fiscal year, with 3.2 
chosen to generate a frequency of 0.1% in the normal distribution. Our first measure of crash 
likelihood for each firm in each year, denoted CRASH, is an indicator variable that equals one for 
a firm–year that experiences one or more crash weeks (as defined above) during the fiscal year 
and zero otherwise. 
Following Chen et al. (2001) and Jin and Myers (2006), our second measure of crash risk 
is calculated as the negative skewness of firm-specific weekly returns (NCSKEW). Specifically, 
we calculate NCSKEW for a given firm in a fiscal year by taking the negative of the third 
moment of firm-specific weekly returns for each sample year and dividing it by the standard 
deviation of firm-specific weekly returns raised to the third power. 
Following Chen et al. (2001), our third measure is the asymmetric volatility of negative 
versus positive returns (DUVOL). For each firm j over a fiscal year t, we separate all the weeks 
with firm-specific weekly returns below the annual mean (“down” weeks) from those with firm-
specific returns above the annual mean (“up” weeks) and calculate the standard deviation for 
each of these subsamples separately. The variable DUVOL is the log of the ratio of the standard 
deviation on the down weeks to the standard deviation on the up weeks. 
4. Empirical analysis 
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Descriptive statistics and univariate analysis 
Table 1, Panel A, reports the descriptive statistics for our main variables. The Appendix 
provides definitions for all variables. The mean value of CRASH is 0.172, suggesting that the 
unconditional probability of a firm-specific crash over a year is 17.2%, based on our definition of 
a crash event. The average frequency of overconfident CEOs generated by the option-based 
measure (i.e., OC_CJRS) is 35.4%, which is almost identical to the 34.1% frequency reported by 
Campbell et al. (2011). The firm-level measure of overconfidence (i.e., OC_SZ) generates an 
average overconfidence frequency of 18.1%. However, after we convert the firm-level measure 
into a CEO-level measure (i.e., OC_MSZ), the frequency of overconfident CEOs becomes 35.3%, 
which is almost the same as the frequency generated by the option-based measure. 
Panel B of Table 1 presents the univariate analysis on the relation between CEO 
overconfidence and crash risk. Consistent with our prediction, firms operated by overconfident 
CEOs have significantly higher crash risk according to all three measures of overconfidence and 
all three measures of crash risk. Table 2 displays the correlation matrix. As expected, all three 
measures of crash risk are highly positively correlated. The three measures of overconfidence are 
also significantly and positively correlated. 
Main regression analysis 
To formally test our prediction that CEO overconfidence is positively related to stock 
price crash risk, we use the general regression specification 
    .
'
10   iablesControlVarentCEOOverconfidCrashRisk                (2) 
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In Eq. (2), the dependent variable CrashRisk, measured in year t, is one of three crash risk 
proxies: CRASH, NCSKEW, and DUVOL. In estimating Eq. (2), we use logit regression when 
CRASH is the dependent variable and ordinary least squares (OLS) when either NCSKEW or 
DUVOL is the dependent variable. All the independent variables are measured in year t - 1. The 
key variable of interest, OverconfidentCEO, is one of the three proxies for CEO overconfidence 
(i.e., OC_CJRS, OC_SZ, and OC_MSZ). 
Following prior research on crash risk (Chen et al. 2001; Hutton et al. 2009; Kim et al. 
2011a, 2011b), we include a set of control variables in the regression model. Hong and Stein 
(2003) show that investor belief heterogeneity predicts future crash likelihood. To control for this 
effect, we include the detrended stock trading volume (DTURNOVER) in the regression, which is 
a proxy for differences of opinions between investors (Chen et al. 2001). To capture the potential 
persistence of the third moment of stock returns, we control for the negative skewness of past 
firm-specific stock returns (NCSKEW). Since more volatile stocks are potentially more crash 
prone, we control for past return volatility (SIGMA). In addition, to the extent that our option-
based measure of overconfidence (OC_CJRS) may also reflect CEO risk attitudes (Malmendier 
and Tate 2005), SIGMA should help us to rule out the alternative explanation that any 
documented empirical relation between OC_CJRS and crash risk is caused by CEO risk-taking 
behaviors. 
However, we want to stress that even if the risk tolerance attribute confounds our results 
to some extent, it does not overturn the key insight of the paper, that CEO personal attributes 
matter for crash risk (Hirshleifer et al. 2012). Moreover, one manifestation of overconfidence is 
greater risk tolerance (Baker and Wurgler 2012), which means that controlling for volatility 
makes our test more stringent. Malmendier et al. (2011) argue that it is important to control for 
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past return performance when using OC_CJRS as a proxy for overconfidence because OC_CJRS 
may mix information about CEO beliefs with information about firm performance. Thus we also 
include past return performance in our regression (RET).6 Following Chen et al. (2001) and 
Hutton et al. (2009), we also control the following firm characteristics: firm size (SIZE), the 
market-to-book ratio (MB), financial leverage (LEV), and return on assets (ROA). Finally, Hutton 
et al. (2009) find that financial reporting opacity has a non-linear effect on crash risk. Thus, we 
also include their financial reporting opacity measure (OPAQUE) and its squared term as 
additional control variables. In all regressions, we also include industry and fiscal year indicators 
to control for industry and time fixed effects. 
It is important to distinguish our theory from traditional agency theory explanations for 
stock price crashes (Baker and Wurgler 2012). Thus, following most of the empirical research on 
overconfidence, we also control for the potential conflict of interest between managers and 
shareholders. In particular, we calculate and include the strength of CEO stock incentives 
(INCENTIVE_STK) and option incentives (INCENTIVE_OPT) following the methodology of 
Bergstresser and Philippon (2006). Benmelech et al. (2010) argue that equity incentives induce 
CEOs to hide bad firm performance and lead to future crashes. Kim et al. (2011a) show that 
executive option incentives are stronger than stock incentives in inducing bad news hoarding. 
Our main measure of overconfidence, OC_CJRS, is also derived from CEO option holdings data 
and thus is naturally correlated with the option incentive measure. However, it is important to 
note that these two measures capture sufficiently different things: INCENTIVE_OPT is a firm–
year measure that captures the features of a firm’s incentive system over the fiscal year, whereas 
                                                            
6 Following prior research, past return performance is estimated over the past fiscal year. However, our results are 
the same if we expand the past return measurement window to the past three or five years. Note that controlling for 
past returns (as well as ROA and MB) make our test more stringent, since the CEO may become overconfident as a 
consequence of experiencing strong past performance. 
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OC_CJRS is a CEO fixed effect measure that captures the CEO’s persistent overconfidence 
trait.7 
Table 3 reports the regression results. The t-statistics below the coefficients are based on 
standard errors corrected for firm and year double clustering (Petersen 2009; Thompson 2011). 
Columns (1) to (3) of Table 3 present the results of the logit model regressions with CRASH as 
the dependent variable. As shown in column (1), when OC_CJRS is used as our test variable, the 
coefficient of OC_CJRS is positive and significant, consistent with our prediction that firms with 
overconfident CEOs have higher crash risk. In columns (2) and (3), the overconfidence proxies 
OC_SZ and OC_MSZ are based on multiple CEO–firm overconfident behaviors regarding 
various investing and financing decisions.8 Consistent with the results in column (1), we find that 
the coefficients of both OC_SZ and OC_MSZ are significantly positive, supporting our prediction. 
To assess the economic significance of the results, we estimate the marginal effect of each 
overconfidence variable on crash risk, which is the expected difference in crash likelihood 
between firms with and without highly overconfident CEOs holding all other variables at their 
sample mean. The marginal effects range from 1.4% to 2.3%. Given that the unconditional 
probability of a crash in our sample is 17.2%, these results suggest that the association between 
CEO overconfidence and crash risk is economically significant. 
Columns (4) to (9) of Table 3 report the results of OLS regressions with NCSKEW and 
DUVOL as the dependent variables, respectively. The coefficients of the overconfidence proxies 
continue to be positive and are significant, consistent with our prediction. Overall, the results in 
                                                            
7 The results are qualitatively similar if we include both CEO and CFO equity incentives as control variables. 
8 We also use each individual component of OC_SZ and OC_MSZ as a proxy for overconfidence. Untabulated 
results show that excess investment-, net acquisition-, and dividend yield-based measures are significantly and 
positively related to future crash risk, whereas the two capital structure-based proxies are not significantly related to 
future crash risk. Consistent with Kim, Luo, and Xie (2014), we find that firms that do not pay dividend have higher 
crash risk. 
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Table 3 support our prediction that CEO overconfidence is positively associated with future 
crash risk. The main analysis in Table 3 uses a one-year window to estimate future firm-specific 
stock price crash risk. Following Kim et al. (2011b), we also calculate the three crash risk 
measures using firm-specific weekly returns over the future two- and three-year periods and find 
that the relation between CEO overconfidence and future crash risk continues to be positive and 
significant. 
Endogeneity 
One concern for our empirical findings is reverse causality. One may argue, for some 
reason, that more crash-prone firms are more likely to hire overconfident CEOs. In our 
regressions, the independent variables are lagged by one year relative to the crash risk measures. 
We also control for lagged crash risk (NCSKEWt-1) in the regression, partially addressing the 
reverse causality issue. Importantly, because crashes are rare events, it is unlikely that a firm can 
accurately estimate its crash risk and choose an overconfident CEO to reduce it. Overconfident 
managers may self-select (or be selected) into companies with high growth or business risk (e.g., 
Graham et al. 2012) and high-growth (risk) firms may have higher crash risk than low-growth 
firms. This overconfidence–growth matching issue is addressed by including control variables of 
growth and risk (market to book, return volatility). We also use past sales growth and earnings 
growth as additional control variables and find similar results.9 In addition, following Hirshleifer 
et al. (2012), we reexamine the effects of overconfidence after eliminating firm–years in which 
the manager is new (with less than a three- or five-year tenure). Because the matching effects 
between CEO overconfidence and firm characteristics are strongest when the CEO is first 
                                                            
9 The results are also robust to controlling for additional variables, including CEO compensation vega, firm location 
fixed effects, and the number of business/geographic segments. 
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appointed, removing firm–years with short-tenure CEOs should help us further rule out the 
alternative explanations of endogenous matching. The results are almost identical to previous 
findings. 
Our measures of overconfidence can capture decisions undertaken by previous CEOs. For 
instance, capital structure and dividend policies are generally very sticky and the observed levels 
of these proxies during the current CEO’s tenure can be due to the decisions of previous CEOs. 
One comfortable result is that our main results based on OC_SZ (OC_MSZ) are mainly driven by 
the proxy’s investment-related components, which are arguably less sticky than capital structure 
and dividend policies. Moreover, removing CEOs with short tenure can also help address the 
policy stickiness issue. 
To further address the above concerns of endogeneity, we next conduct a change analysis. 
Specifically, we examine whether changes in overconfidence following CEO turnovers are 
positively related to changes in stock price crash risk. Toward this end, we use the two CEO-
level measures of overconfidence, which are theoretically more appropriate and powerful in the 
CEO turnover tests.10 In our sample period of 1993 to 2010, we identify 3,323 (3,238) CEO 
changes with nonmissing data on OC_CJRS (OC_MSZ). We require the outgoing CEO to have 
been in office for at least three years prior to the CEO change and the incoming CEO to have 
remained in office for at least three years subsequent to the CEO change. We lose a total of 1,657 
(1,607) CEO changes for the OC_CJRS (OC_MSZ) measure due to this requirement. For each 
CEO turnover case, we next estimate crash risk measures over the three-year window before the 
                                                            
10 For example, using the firm-level measure in the CEO turnover design entails the problem of firm policy 
stickiness. In fact, we do not find a significant result when using the firm-level measure in the change analysis. 
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turnover and the same measures over the three-year window after the turnover.11 In this process, 
we lose 774 (745) CEO changes for the OC_CJRS (OC_MSZ) sample. Lastly, we require 
nonmissing data for the control variables in the first year after the CEO change and three years 
before the CEO change and thus lose 227 (221) CEO changes for the OC_CJRS (OC_MSZ) 
sample. The final sample consists of 655 (655) CEO changes for the OC_CJRS (OC_MSZ) 
sample. 
We estimate a change specification of Eq. (2) using the two samples (based on the two 
measures of overconfidence) of CEO changes and report the results in Table 4. Columns (1) and 
(2) of Table 4 show that changes in CEO overconfidence are not significantly related to future 
crash risk in regressions where ΔCRASH is the dependent variable. In contrast, for both measures 
of CEO overconfidence, columns (3) to (6) show that changes in CEO overconfidence are 
significantly and positively related to future crash risk when we use the continuous crash risk 
measures (i.e., ΔNCSKEW and ΔDUVOL). The insignificant results in columns (1) and (2) are 
likely to be due to the lack of variation in within-firm changes of the indicator variable CRASH, 
which is, by definition, outlier events. Overall, the results in Table 4 suggest that changes in 
overconfidence following CEO turnovers are positively related to changes in stock price crash 
risk, further alleviating the variety of concerns about endogeneity or self-selection. 
5. Cross-sectional analysis 
In this section, we conduct several cross-sectional analyses. Baker and Wurgler (2012) 
argue that for less than fully rational managers to have an impact, corporate governance must be 
limited in its ability to constrain them into making rational decisions. This argument suggests 
                                                            
11 We measure crash risk using a three-year window to allow sufficient time for bad news or bad performance to 
materialize under the current CEO’s leadership. 
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that corporate governance mechanisms that are designed to solve traditional agency problems 
can also help constrain overconfident managers.12 
CEO dominance and governance 
Sah and Stiglitz (1986, 1991) argue that the architecture of an economic system or 
organization affects the judgment errors made by individuals within the system or organization, 
as well as how those errors are aggregated. This is because the members in the system or 
organization may disagree, creating the so-called diversification of opinions effect. The social 
psychology literature on group decision making draws similar conclusions (Kogan and Wallach 
1966). This section examines whether the relation between CEO overconfidence and crash risk is 
affected by CEO dominance within the top management team. Following Bebchuk et al. (2011), 
we use the CPS to capture the CEO’s centrality or dominance within the top management team. 
Specifically, the CPS is the fraction of the aggregate compensation of the top-five executive 
team captured by the CEO. According to the findings of Bebchuk et al. (2011) and Chen et al. 
(2013), the CPS can also be seen as a proxy of “bad governance” or CEO entrenchment, in that 
CEO behaviors (both rational opportunistic and irrational optimistic behaviors) are less 
constrained in firms with a higher CPS.13 
Table 5 presents the subsample analysis for firms with dominant (above-median CPS) 
and non-dominant (below-median CPS) CEOs.14 Consistent with our prediction, the impact of 
                                                            
12 We are not trying to differentiate the traditional agency problem from overconfidence using these tests. 
13 The CPS can also be installed by the board as a mechanism to encourage risk taking (i.e., tournament theory). 
Overconfident managers, who are more risk tolerant, are more likely to become CEOs when a firm has a larger CPS. 
Thus, the CPS can be correlated with both CEO overconfidence and crash risk. In untabulated robustness tests, we 
find that the impact of overconfidence on crash risk continues to be positive and significant after controlling for the 
CPS. Moreover, we find no evidence that the subsample of firms with a high CPS have more overconfident CEOs. 
14  Throughout this section, we conduct cross-sectional analysis using subsamples instead of interaction terms 
because subsample analysis allows all coefficients (including coefficients of fixed effects) to vary, conditioning on 
the partitioning variable. Using interaction terms with continuous variables, we find qualitatively similar results. We 
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CEO overconfidence on crash risk is generally more pronounced for firms with dominant CEOs 
than those with non-dominant CEOs. The CEO dominance results support the conjecture that 
corporate governance has a moderating effect on the relation between overconfidence and crash 
risk. To further examine the governance effect, we also analyze subsamples partitioned by the G-
Index of Gompers et al. (2003) and the percentage of outside directors. Consistent with the 
findings of Ahmed and Duellman (2013) and Schrand and Zechman (2012), we find no 
meaningful moderating effects for these governance variables. 
The effect of conditional conservatism 
Prior research argues that accounting conservatism constrains managers’ ability to hide 
bad news and accelerate good news recognition in audited financial reports and voluntary 
disclosures (Kothari et al. 2010; Watts 2003). Kim and Zhang (2015) find evidence that 
conditional conservatism in financial reporting lowers the likelihood of a firm’s future stock 
price crashes. In this section, we examine whether conditional conservatism can limit 
overconfident CEOs’ tendency to withhold bad news and mitigate the impact of CEO 
overconfidence on stock price crashes. Table 6 presents the subsample analysis for firms with 
above-median conservatism levels and below median conservatism levels. We measure 
conditional conservatism using the conservatism ratio of Callen et al. (2010).15 Consistent with 
our prediction, the impact of CEO overconfidence on crash risk is more pronounced for firms 
with less conservative accounting policies than for firms with more conservative accounting 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
also split samples using tertiles or quartiles and the results are again qualitatively similar to those based on median 
cuts. 
15 Please refer to Callen et al. (2010) for detailed procedures for constructing the conservatism ratio. Following 
Callen et al., we restrict the sample to observations with negative unexpected returns because conservatism is likely 
to be manifested when news is bad. To increase the sample size, we retain a firm in our sample if the firm 
experiences at least one negative shock during the past three years. The results are qualitatively similar if we use the 
Basu (1997) measure of conservatism. 
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policies. The results suggest that conditional conservatism, designed as a governance mechanism 
to discipline managerial opportunistic behaviors, also helps to mitigate the adverse effect of 
overconfidence. 
Differences of opinion among investors 
Hong and Stein (2003) show that investor heterogeneity is a central contributor to stock 
price crashes. In this section, we examine whether the effect of overconfidence is exacerbated by 
investor heterogeneity. We conjecture that, when differences of opinion among investors are 
greater, overconfident CEOs should have less pressure to address the concerns of bearish 
investors. The argument is logically similar to the diversification of opinions effect of Sah and 
Stiglitz (1986, 1991), in that when the investors themselves disagree, overconfident CEOs are 
less constrained or they perceive themselves to be less constrained. To conduct the subsample 
analysis, we use analyst forecast dispersion as a proxy for differences of opinion among 
investors. The results in Table 7 show that the effect of overconfidence on crash risk is generally 
more pronounced for the subsample of firms with higher levels of differences of opinion among 
investors, consistent with our conjecture.16 
6. Robustness checks and discussions 
Discussions on the option-based measure 
Our main measure of overconfidence captures a manager’s propensity to delay the 
exercise of in-the-money options. Voluntarily holding in-the-money options, however, may also 
be consistent with other interpretations, involving, for example, inside information and risk 
                                                            
16 The results are qualitatively similar if we use the breadth of ownership as the proxy for differences of opinion. 
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tolerance. In this section, we discuss these interpretations and their impact on the inferences 
drawn from our empirical results. 
Past performance and tax 
The option-based measure of overconfidence depends on option moneyness. Since stock 
options are normally granted with exercise prices equal to the stock prices on the grant dates, the 
moneyness threshold for the option-based measure (e.g., 100% in the money) is more likely to be 
crossed if a firm experiences strong stock performance since the grant dates. Therefore the 
option-based measure can reflect both a manager’s tendency to delay option exercise and the 
firm’s past stock performance. If strong past stock performance is due to some pricing bubble, 
we will observe a positive relation between the option-based measure and future crashes, even 
without the overconfidence effect. In addition, CEOs may delay the exercise of in-the-money 
options because of personal tax concerns (Jin and Kothari 2008). A manager whose firm 
experiences strong past performance should have a higher tax burden and be more likely to delay 
option exercise. Thus, asset pricing bubbles can lead to both option exercise delay and future 
crashes. To rule out alternative explanations related to past performance, we control for past 
stock returns, return on assets, and the market-to-book ratio in our regression analyses. In 
addition, our CEO turnover test of Table 4 further alleviates the above concern because the 
influence of past performance on the option-based measure (as well as crash risk) is essentially 
removed by the design of the change analysis. 
As an additional robustness check, we identify a subsample of firms meeting the 
following two criteria: (1) The current CEO has been in office over the past three years; and (2) 
the firm has experienced a significant increase in stock price over the past three years (stock 
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returns are positive and in the top quartile of the industry). This subsample makes it possible to 
compare overconfident CEOs with executives that have had the requisite stock price increase to 
be classified as overconfident but exercised their options upon vesting rather than holding onto 
them. Table 8 reports the results of estimating the main regression using the subsample. In Table 
8, the coefficient of OC_CJRS is positive and significant across all three measures of crash risk, 
even though the subsample is much smaller than the full sample used in Table 3. This result 
provides further assurance that the increased crash risk is driven by overconfidence and not by 
past performance. 
Inside information and signaling 
Managers can delay the exercise of options because they have favorable inside 
information about future firm performance. By retaining options, they can personally profit from 
the expected stock price appreciation or signal the favorable information to investors. However, 
Malmendier and Tate (2005) find that, on average, CEOs do not beat the market by holding in-
the-money options. More importantly, the favorable inside information interpretation of the 
option-based measure contradicts our findings that the measure is positively related to future 
stock price crashes. 
Risk tolerance 
Managers with high risk tolerance can also hold their options beyond the threshold 
because they are less affected by underdiversification. High risk tolerance can result in greater 
risk taking and higher future crash risk. In our main tests, we control for annual stock return 
volatility to rule out the risk-taking effect. In addition, the CRASH measure of crash risk is 
calculated relative to contemporaneous volatility, further ruling out the risk-taking explanation. 
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In an unreported robustness check, we include R&D expenditures as an additional control 
variable and find that all the results hold. However, to the extent that investment risk cannot be 
fully captured by these control variables, our research should be interpreted with some caveats. 
Other robustness checks 
Our main model includes a measure of financial reporting opacity (OPAQUE) to make 
sure that our results are not simply driven by the effect of overconfidence on financial reporting 
quality. Note, however, that financial reporting quality is one channel through which 
overconfidence has an impact on crash risk. For robustness, we include conditional conservatism 
as an additional control variable in the regression.17 As expected, the impact of overconfidence 
on crash risk is significant and positive even if both accrual quality and conditional conservatism 
are controlled for. Callen and Fang (2013) find that institutional ownership is associated with 
crash risk. Our results continue to hold if we include institutional ownership (or different 
classifications of institutional ownership) as an additional control variable. Finally, we examine 
whether the impact of CEO overconfidence on crash risk remains after controlling for CFO 
overconfidence. The results show that the impact of CEO overconfidence on crash risk remains 
positive and significant even after controlling for CFO overconfidence. In addition, we find that 
the effect of CFO overconfidence on crash risk is largely insignificant. 
A more powerful method to control for time-invariant omitted variables is to include firm 
fixed effects. However, in out setting, we are interested in a stable trait of CEOs and within-firm 
changes in CEO overconfidence are infrequent in our sample. Nonetheless, we run the main 
model by including firm fixed effects and the effect of overconfidence on crash risk is generally 
insignificant when using a one-year window to measure crash risk. However, the effect is 
                                                            
17 We use both the firm–year measure of Callen et al. (2010) and Basu’s (1997) firm-specific coefficient to measure conservatism. 
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significantly positive when we use a three-year measure of crash risk. Another potential issue is 
that some unknown CEO-level effects may confound our findings. However, it is more 
problematic to control for CEO fixed effects because we are interested in a stable trait of the 
CEO. As discussed before, even if some unknown CEO fixed effect is driving our results, it does 
not overturn the key insight of the paper, that CEOs’ personal attributes matter for crash risk. To 
partially address this issue, we explicitly include some CEO-level variables (age, gender, and 
education) as additional control variables in the regression. The effect of overconfidence on 
crash risk is unaffected by these CEO-level control variables. 
7. Conclusions and limitations 
This study examines the impact of CEO overconfidence on firm-specific stock price 
crash risk. Overconfidence is defined as a set of interrelated positive illusions: positive self-
evaluations, an exaggerated perception of mastery or control, and unrealistic optimism about 
future outcomes. We infer CEO overconfidence from their personal portfolio decisions, as well 
as their firms’ investing and financing decisions. Using a large sample of CEOs from the 
ExecuComp database over the period 1993–2010, we find that overconfidence is significantly 
and positively associated with firm-specific stock price crash risk. 
Our research is the first to show that managerial personal traits are a contributing factor 
to stock price crashes, which represents an important complement to traditional agency theory 
explanations for stock price crashes. Unlike CEOs in the traditional agency theory framework, 
overconfident CEOs believe that they are maximizing long-term firm value by continuing 
negative NPV projects and hiding the “temporary” bad performance of those projects. Thus 
traditional governance mechanisms that align the interests of managers and outside investors are 
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likely to be less useful in reducing overconfidence-induced crashes. Our subsample analysis, 
however, does suggest that a better organizational structure of the top management team and a 
higher level of conditional conservatism in a firm’s financial reporting can help mitigate the 
adverse impacts of individual managers’ personal traits. 
The results of our study cannot be taken as evidence that firms should avoid 
overconfident CEOs. On the contrary, CEO overconfidence can be beneficial, because 
overconfident managers can be more innovative and innovation is a key driver of economic 
growth. The takeaway from our study is that the board should consider installing mechanisms 
(such as conservative accounting policy) to mitigate the adverse side effects of CEO 
overconfidence, to the extent that these side effects are not within the acceptable set of outcomes 
for the board or investors. 
Our study has at least three limitations. First, while we interpret our findings as evidence 
of managerial optimism, we cannot completely rule out the possibility that the results are driven 
by managerial opportunism. Second, the implications of this study are limited by the validity of 
our proxies of overconfidence, which is notoriously difficult to measure. Finally, although we 
have conducted a battery of robustness checks, the issue of endogeneity remains, given the lack 
of an exogenous shock in our research designs. The limitations of our study can be fruitful 
avenues for future research. 
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Appendix. Variable definitions 
Dependent variables: Crash risk measures 
CRASH is an indicator variable that equals one for a firm–year that experiences one or more 
crash weeks during the fiscal year period and zero otherwise. Crash weeks are defined as those 
weeks during which the firm experiences firm-specific weekly returns 3.2 standard deviations 
below the mean firm-specific weekly returns over the entire fiscal year, with 3.2 standard 
deviations chosen to generate a frequency of 0.1% in the normal distribution. 
The firm-specific-weekly return (W) is equal to ln(1 + residual), where the residual is from the 
expanded index model regression 
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NCSKEW is the negative skewness of firm-specific weekly returns over the fiscal year period. 
DUVOL is the log of the ratio of the standard deviation of firm-specific weekly returns for down 
weeks to the standard deviation of firm-specific weekly returns for up weeks. For each firm j 
over a fiscal year period t, we define down weeks as all the weeks with firm-specific weekly 
returns below the annual mean and up weeks as those with firm-specific returns above the annual 
mean. 
CEO overconfidence measures 
OC_CJRS is the modified Malmendier–Tate (2005) option-based measure of CEO 
overconfidence. Following Campbell et al. (2011), we define a CEO as overconfident if the CEO 
holds options at least twice during the sample period that are more than 100% in the money. The 
measure OC_CJRS takes the value of one beginning with the first time the CEO exhibits the 
above option-holding behavior and zero otherwise. 
 
OC_SZ is a firm-specific overconfidence score constructed following Schrand and Zechman 
(2012). It takes the value of one if the firm meets the requirements of at least three of the 
following five criteria and zero otherwise: i) Excess investment is in the top quartile within 
industry–years, where excess investment is the residual from a regression of total asset growth 
on sales growth; ii) net acquisitions from the statement of cash flows are in the top quartile 
within industry–years; iii) the debt-to-equity ratio is in the top quartile within industry–years, 
where the debt-to-equity ratio is defined as long-term plus short-term debt divided by total 
market value; iv) either convertible debt or preferred stock is greater than zero; and v) the 
dividend yield is zero. 
OC_MSZ is a CEO-level overconfidence measure modified from OC_SZ. If in one year the 
CEO’s firm has a score of OC_SZ equal to one, starting from that year the CEO is considered 
overconfident. 
 
 
36 
 
Other control variables 
DTURNOVER is the average monthly share turnover over the current fiscal year period minus 
the average monthly share turnover over the previous fiscal year period, where monthly share 
turnover is calculated as the monthly trading volume divided by the total number of shares 
outstanding during the month. 
 
SIGMA is the standard deviation of firm-specific weekly returns over the fiscal year period. 
 
RET is the mean of firm-specific weekly returns over the fiscal year period, times 100. 
 
SIZE is the log of the market value of equity. 
 
MB is the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity. 
 
LEV is total long-term debt divided by total assets. 
 
ROA is income before extraordinary items divided by lagged total assets. 
 
INCENTIVE_OPT is the incentive ratio for executive option holdings, which is measured as 
ONEPCT_OPT/(ONEPCT_OPT + SALARY + BONUS). The variable ONEPCT_OPT is the 
dollar change in the value of executive option holdings resulting from a 1% increase in the firm’s 
stock price measured as 0.01 × share price × option delta × number of options, assuming the 
option delta equals one. 
 
INCENTIVE_STK is the incentive ratio for executive stock holdings, defined similarly to 
INCENTIVE_OPT. 
 
OPAQUE is the prior three years’ moving sum of the absolute value of discretionary accruals 
(Hutton et al., 2009). 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Full-sample statistics 
Variables N Mean Std 25% Median 75% 
      
CRASHt 17568 0.172 0.378 0.000 0.000 0.000 
NCSKEWt 17568 0.068 0.740 -0.329 0.021 0.410 
DUVOLt 17568 0.027 0.345 -0.197 0.012 0.236 
OC_CJRS t-1 17568 0.354 0.478 0.000 0.000 1.000 
OC_SZ t-1 16299 0.181 0.385 0.000 0.000 0.000 
OC_MSZ t-1 16299 0.353 0.478 0.000 0.000 1.000 
DTURNOVERt-1 17568 0.007 0.096 -0.019 0.004 0.033 
NCSKEWt-1 17568 0.088 0.701 -0.311 0.030 0.410 
SIGMAt-1 17568 0.118 0.119 0.051 0.083 0.140 
RETt-1 17568 -1.083 3.106 -0.957 -0.340 -0.126 
SIZEt-1 17568 7.251 1.590 6.157 7.090 8.220 
MBt-1 17568 3.822 43.009 1.570 2.384 3.792 
LEVt-1 17568 0.201 0.163 0.045 0.193 0.314 
ROAt-1 17568 0.053 0.137 0.020 0.060 0.104 
INCENTIVE_STKt-1 17568 0.162 0.235 0.018 0.056 0.188 
INCENTIVE_OPTt-1 17568 0.161 0.163 0.048 0.113 0.221 
OPAQUEt-1 17568 0.244 0.295 0.094 0.155 0.272 
 
Panel B: Univariate tests of the difference in crash risk between firms with non-overconfident CEOs and firms with 
overconfident CEOs 
Overconfidence measure: OC_CJRS  
 Non-overconfident CEO (N = 11,347) Overconfident CEO (N = 6,221) 
 Mean Median Mean Median 
CRASHt 0.163 0.000 0.190*** 0.000*** 
NCSKEWt 0.041 0.008 0.118*** 0.046*** 
DUVOLt 0.015 0.005 0.049*** 0.028*** 
 
Overconfidence measure: OC_SZ 
 Non-overconfident CEO (N = 13,357) Overconfident CEO (N = 2,942) 
 Mean Median Mean Median 
CRASHt 0.168 0.000 0.203*** 0.000*** 
NCSKEWt 0.056 0.013 0.128*** 0.067*** 
DUVOLt 0.021 0.008 0.057*** 0.034*** 
 
Overconfidence measure: OC_MSZ 
 Non-Overconfident CEO (N = 13,656) Overconfident CEO (N = 7,093) 
 Mean Median Mean Median 
CRASHt 0.164 0.000 0.193*** 0.000*** 
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NCSKEWt 0.049 0.004 0.106*** 0.058*** 
DUVOLt 0.016 0.003 0.047*** 0.032*** 
 
Notes: This table reports the descriptive statistics for stock price crash risk measures, CEO overconfidence measures, 
and control variables. The sample period is from 1993 to 2010. All variables are defined in the Appendix. Panel A 
reports the statistics of the full sample. Panel B presents univariate comparisons of crash risk between firms with 
overconfident CEOs and firms with non-overconfident CEOs. In Panel B, t-tests (Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney tests) 
are conducted to test for differences in means (medians). Here *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2 
Correlations 
 A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q 
CRASHt A 1.00    
NCSKEWt B 0.63 1.00                
DUVOLt C 0.56 0.96 1.00               
OC_CJRS t-1 D 0.03 0.05 0.05 1.00              
OC_SZ t-1 E 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.06 1.00             
OC_MSZ t-1 F 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.15 0.64 1.00            
DTURNOVER t-1 G 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.01 1.00           
NCSKEWt-1 H 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 1.00          
SIGMAt-1 I 0.09 0.16 0.17 0.02 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.25 1.00         
RETt-1 J -0.07 -0.11 -0.12 0.00 -0.06 -0.05 -0.03 -0.19 -0.65 1.00        
SIZEt-1 K -0.03 0.02 0.03 0.11 0.01 0.06 0.06 -0.03 -0.20 0.13 1.00       
MBt-1 L 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 1.00      
LEVt-1 M -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.08 0.31 0.31 0.05 0.00 0.09 -0.04 0.05 0.03 1.00     
ROAt-1 N 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.11 -0.08 -0.08 0.09 -0.03 -0.18 0.11 0.23 0.00 -0.15 1.00    
INCENTIVE_STKt-1 O 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.14 -0.01 0.03 0.00 -0.01 -0.06 0.04 0.14 0.01 -0.13 0.14 1.00   
INCENTIVE_OPTt-1 P 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.29 0.06 0.14 0.02 0.01 -0.06 0.03 0.47 0.03 -0.05 0.10 0.21 1.00  
OPAQUEt-1 Q 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.04 -0.05 0.04 0.13 -0.08 -0.07 0.01 -0.11 -0.16 0.03 0.08 1.00 
 
Notes: This table presents the correlation of the main variables. The sample period is from 1993 to 2010. All variables are defined in the Appendix. The values in 
bold are significant at better than the 5% level.  
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Table 3 
The impact of CEO overconfidence on crash risk 
Dependent Variable: CRASHt NCSKEWt DUVOLt
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
CEO Overconfidence          
OC_CJRS t-1 0.103*   0.049***   0.022***   
 (1.92)   (4.37)   (4.17)   
OC_SZ t-1  0.162***   0.045**   0.023***  
  (3.02)   (2.50)   (2.64)  
OC_MSZ t-1   0.144***   0.033***   0.019*** 
   (3.62)   (3.17)   (3.99) 
Control Variables          
DTURNOVER t-1 0.315** 0.326* 0.340* 0.082 0.080 0.084 0.025 0.024 0.026 
 (2.41) (1.88) (1.95) (1.05) (0.86) (0.91) (0.65) (0.53) (0.57) 
NCSKEWt-1 0.014 0.018 0.018 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.61) (0.72) (0.70) (0.43) (0.51) (0.51) (0.49) (0.43) (0.43) 
SIGMAt-1 1.412*** 1.423*** 1.407*** 0.901*** 0.926*** 0.922*** 0.466*** 0.477*** 0.474*** 
 (8.35) (8.98) (8.89) (9.68) (10.27) (10.35) (9.73) (10.28) (10.34) 
RETt-1 -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (-4.13) (-3.47) (-3.53) (-2.94) (-2.85) (-2.89) (-3.13) (-3.35) (-3.42) 
SIZEt-1 -0.025 -0.019 -0.021 0.024*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 
 (-1.02) (-0.73) (-0.78) (3.31) (3.71) (3.65) (3.55) (3.89) (3.84) 
MBt-1 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000** 
 (-1.02) (-1.06) (-1.04) (-2.14) (-1.57) (-1.42) (-3.13) (-2.43) (-2.21) 
LEVt-1 0.000 -0.162 -0.168 -0.027 -0.078* -0.073 -0.005 -0.031 -0.031 
 (0.00) (-1.24) (-1.28) (-0.64) (-1.81) (-1.63) (-0.28) (-1.49) (-1.46) 
ROAt-1 0.302 0.338 0.351 0.174* 0.199* 0.200* 0.104** 0.118** 0.119** 
 (1.05) (1.02) (1.04) (1.86) (1.91) (1.91) (2.33) (2.35) (2.35) 
INCENTIVE_STKt-1 0.078 0.047 0.035 -0.005 -0.008 -0.010 0.000 -0.004 -0.006 
 (0.85) (0.51) (0.38) (-0.20) (-0.34) (-0.44) (0.02) (-0.38) (-0.52) 
INCENTIVE_OPTt-1 0.042 0.109 0.088 -0.027 0.002 -0.002 -0.023 -0.013 -0.016 
 (0.32) (0.80) (0.67) (-0.50) (0.03) (-0.04) (-0.87) (-0.45) (-0.55) 
OPAQUEt-1 0.447*** 0.403*** 0.413*** 0.093** 0.072 0.076* 0.039** 0.029 0.030* 
 (3.34) (3.01) (3.15) (2.20) (1.63) (1.74) (2.21) (1.55) (1.65) 
OPAQUEt-1* OPAQUEt-1 -0.176*** -0.164*** -0.165*** -0.030** -0.023* -0.023** -0.010** -0.006 -0.007* 
 (-2.81) (-3.41) (-3.58) (-2.30) (-1.90) (-2.05) (-2.20) (-1.53) (-1.66) 
Constant -1.764*** -1.830*** -1.854*** -0.053 -0.566 -0.569 -0.058* -0.171 -0.172 
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 (-5.35) (-8.13) (-8.31) (-0.73) (-1.13) (-1.14) (-1.72) (-1.30) (-1.29) 
          
Observations 17,513 16,254 16,254 17,568 16,299 16,299 17,568 16,299 16,299 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo-R2/Adj. R2 0.027 0.026 0.026 0.043 0.044 0.044 0.051 0.053 0.053 
 
Notes: This table reports the regression results of the impact of CEO overconfidence on crash risk. The sample contains firms in ExecuComp from 1993 to 2010 
with non-missing values for the CEO overconfidence measures and all control variables. All variables are defined in the Appendix. The Z-statistics (t-statistics) 
reported in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by both firm and time. Here ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
  
42 
 
Table 4 
Change analysis 
Dependent Variable: ∆CRASH ∆NCSKEW ∆DUVOL
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CEO Overconfidence       
∆OC_CJRS  -0.116  0.135**  0.044**  
 (-0.77)  (2.57)  (2.48)  
∆OC_MSZ   0.169  0.131*  0.041* 
  (1.34)  (1.70)  (1.70) 
       
Control Variables       
       
∆DTURNOVER  -0.116 0.169 -0.923** -0.762* -0.249** -0.211* 
 (-0.77) (1.34) (-2.25) (-1.75) (-2.32) (-1.89) 
∆LNCSKEW -2.025** -1.897** -0.291*** -0.288*** -0.099*** -0.099*** 
 (-2.17) (-2.02) (-5.79) (-5.42) (-5.77) (-5.43) 
∆SIGMA -0.063 -0.048 0.592 0.324 0.265 0.310 
 (-0.50) (-0.37) (0.64) (0.44) (1.13) (1.31) 
∆RET -0.108 0.124 -0.023*** -0.044 -0.003 -0.003 
 (-0.11) (0.15) (-2.72) (-0.64) (-1.31) (-1.00) 
∆SIZE 0.016 0.022 0.319*** 0.305*** 0.113*** 0.112*** 
 (0.58) (0.87) (6.27) (5.61) (5.97) (6.21) 
∆MB 0.137 0.165 0.020** 0.022*** 0.007** 0.008** 
 (1.05) (1.28) (2.47) (2.78) (2.26) (2.47) 
∆LEV -0.029 -0.026 0.098 0.138 0.097 0.092 
 (-1.07) (-0.94) (0.18) (0.24) (0.58) (0.54) 
∆ROA 0.077 -0.038 0.429 0.484 0.170 0.144 
 (0.10) (-0.05) (0.68) (0.79) (0.72) (0.63) 
∆INCENTIVE_STK 0.035 -0.096 -0.277 -0.317 -0.161 -0.177 
 (0.04) (-0.12) (-0.57) (-0.65) (-1.06) (-1.19) 
∆INCENTIVE_OPT -0.589 -0.566 -0.256 -0.082 -0.077 -0.026 
 (-0.99) (-0.94) (-0.91) (-0.29) (-0.74) (-0.26) 
∆OPAQUE 1.385 1.361 0.025 -0.005 -0.018 -0.022 
 (1.35) (1.40) (0.19) (-0.04) (-0.34) (-0.47) 
∆OPAQUE* ∆OPAQUE 0.251 0.252 0.020 0.007 -0.002 -0.002 
 (1.05) (1.09) (0.48) (0.17) (-0.12) (-0.11) 
Constant -1.611*** -0.860*** 0.296 -0.060 0.045 -0.032 
 (-2.97) (-2.80) (1.00) (-0.65) (0.49) (-0.74) 
       
Observations 653 655 665 665 665 665 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo-/Adj. R2  0.067 0.063 0.105 0.106 0.117 0.117 
 
Notes: This table reports the results of the impact of changes in overconfidence associated with CEO turnovers on 
changes in crash risk. In our sample period from 1993 to 2010, we identify 665 firms that experience a change in 
CEOs where the outgoing CEO has been in office for at least three years and the incoming CEO remains in office 
for at least three years. We subtract the value of the crash risk proxies measured over the three-year window prior to 
the CEO turnover from the value of the same proxies measured over the three-year window subsequent to the CEO 
turnover. For the control variables, we take their values measured at the beginning of the first year during the 
incoming CEO’s term and subtract the values three years before the CEO change. All variables are defined in the 
Appendix. The Z-statistics (t-statistics) reported in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by both firm 
and time. Here ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5 
Subsample analyses: Cut on CEO dominance 
 
 
Notes: This table reports the results of the subsample analyses of the impact of CEO dominance on the relation 
between CEO overconfidence and crash risk. The sample period is from 1993 to 2010. We measure CEO dominance 
as the ratio of CEO compensation over the aggregate compensation of the top-five executive team in a firm–year 
(CPS). The total compensation of each top five executive is the ExecuComp data item TDC1. A low CPS indicates 
below-median CEO dominance and a high-CPS indicates above-median CEO dominance. All other variables are 
defined in the Appendix. The Z-statistics (t-statistics) reported in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered 
by both firm and time. Here ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively.  
 OC_CJRS t-1 OC_SZ t-1 OC_MSZ t-1 
 Low CPS 
(1) 
High CPS 
(2) 
Low CPS 
(3) 
High CPS 
(4) 
Low CPS 
(5) 
High CPS 
(6) 
       
Panel A: Logistic regression of CRASHt on CEO overconfidence 
       
CEO Overconfidence 0.056 0.217** -0.112 0.282*** 0.035 0.120 
 (0.50) (2.25) (-0.94) (2.75) (0.38) (1.26) 
       
Observations 4,825 4,841 4,518 4,517 4,518 4,517 
Pseudo-R2 0.035 0.044 0.036 0.046 0.035 0.064 
Subsample comparison 
of coefficients on CEO 
overconfidence 
 
Chi-Square = 1.80 
(P-value = 0.180) 
 
Chi-Square = 5.60 
(P-value = 0.018) 
 
Chi-Square = 0.40 
(P-value = 0.528) 
Panel B: OLS regression NCSKEWt on CEO overconfidence 
       
CEO Overconfidence 0.014 0.077*** 0.036 0.075** 0.027 0.037* 
 (0.59) (3.35) (1.42) (2.47) (1.24) (1.64) 
       
Observations 4,902 4,902 4,587 4,578 4,587 4,578 
Adj. R2 0.042 0.043 0.044 0.044 0.044 0.045 
Subsample comparison 
of coefficients on CEO 
overconfidence 
 
Chi-Square = 3.50 
(P-value = 0.061) 
 
Chi-Square = 0.78 
(P-value = 0.377) 
 
Chi-Square = 0.02 
(P-value = 0.884) 
Panel C: OLS regression of  DUVOLt  on CEO overconfidence 
       
CEO Overconfidence -0.001 0.033*** 0.015 0.037*** 0.013 0.018* 
 (-0.05) (3.32) (1.02) (2.65) (1.29) (1.78) 
       
Observations 4,902 4,902 4,587 4,578 4,587 4,578 
Adj. R2 0.048 0.053 0.050 0.054 0.050 0.053 
Subsample comparison 
of coefficients on CEO 
overconfidence 
 
Chi-Square = 4.95 
(P-value = 0.026) 
 
Chi-Square = 1.16 
(P-value = 0.281) 
 
Chi-Square = 0.08 
(P-value = 0.775) 
       
Control Variables Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
% Overconfident CEOs 33.8% 37.9% 16.8% 17.6% 33.6% 36.7% 
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Table 6 
Subsample analyses: Cut on accounting conservatism 
 
 
Notes: This table reports the results of the subsample analyses of the impact of conditional conservatism on the 
relation between CEO overconfidence and crash risk. The sample period is from 1993 to 2010. We measure 
conditional conservatism (CC) using the average of Callen et al. (2009) firm year conservatism measure for bad 
news during the past three years. A low CC indicates a below-median level of conditional conservatism and a high 
CC indicates an above median level of conditional conservatism. All other variables are defined in the Appendix. 
The Z-statistics (t-statistics) reported in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by both firm and time. 
Here ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
  
 OC_CJRS t-1 OC_SZ t-1 OC_MSZ t-1 
 Low CC 
(1) 
High CC 
(2) 
Low CC 
(3) 
High CC 
(4) 
Low CC 
(5) 
High CC 
(6) 
       
Panel A: Logistic regression of CRASHt on CEO overconfidence 
       
CEO Overconfidence 0.356*** 0.060 0.178* 0.193* 0.312*** 0.033 
 (2.99) (0.58) (1.86) (1.65) (4.06) (0.38) 
       
Observations 4,214 4,242 3,933 3,964 3,995 4,003 
Pseudo-R2 0.039 0.039 0.036 0.041 0.038 0.041 
Subsample comparison 
of coefficients on CEO 
overconfidence 
 
Chi-Square = 3.69 
(P-value = 0.055) 
 
Chi-Square = 0.05 
(P-value = 0.828) 
 
Chi-Square = 3.46 
(P-value = 0.063) 
Panel B: OLS regression NCSKEWt on CEO overconfidence 
       
CEO Overconfidence 0.085*** 0.013 0.046 0.034 0.072*** 0.007 
 (2.60) (0.46) (1.27) (1.03) (3.56) (0.25) 
       
Observations 4,280 4,281 3,995 4,003 3,995 4,003 
Adj. R2 0.038 0.048 0.029 0.048 0.030 0.047 
% Overconfident CEOs 33.6% 29.4% 17.5% 18.4% 35.1% 35.2% 
Subsample comparison 
of coefficients on CEO 
overconfidence 
 
Chi-Square = 3.63 
(P-value = 0.057) 
 
Chi-Square = 0.06 
(P-value = 0.806) 
 
Chi-Square = 2.85 
(P-value = 0.092) 
Panel C: OLS regression of  DUVOLt  on CEO overconfidence 
       
CEO Overconfidence 0.035** 0.010 0.023 0.016 0.035*** 0.009 
 (2.42) (0.73) (1.27) (1.02) (3.42) (0.72) 
       
Observations 4,280 4,281 3,995 4,003 3,995 4,003 
Adj. R2 0.038 0.058 0.034 0.057 0.036 0.057 
Subsample comparison 
of coefficients on CEO 
overconfidence 
 
Chi-Square = 2.19 
(P-value = 0.139) 
 
Chi-Square = 0.08 
(P-value = 0.776) 
 
Chi-Square = 2.05 
(P-value = 0.152) 
       
Control Variables Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
% Overconfident CEOs 33.6% 29.4% 17.5% 18.4% 35.1% 35.2% 
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Table 7 
Subsample analyses: Cut on analyst forecast dispersion 
 
 
Notes: This table reports the results of the subsample analyses of the impact of analyst forecast dispersion on the 
relation between CEO overconfidence and crash risk. The sample period is from 1993 to 2010. We measure analyst 
forecast dispersion using the standard deviation of analyst forecasts on the annual earnings of the past year. Low 
dispersion indicates a below-median level of forecast dispersion and high dispersion indicates an above median level 
of forecast dispersion. All other variables are defined in the Appendix. The Z-statistics (t-statistics) reported in 
parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by both firm and time. Here ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
 OC_CJRS t-1 OC_SZ t-1 OC_MSZ t-1 
 Low 
dispersion 
(1) 
High 
dispersion 
(2) 
Low 
dispersion 
(3) 
High 
dispersion 
(4) 
Low 
dispersion 
(5) 
High 
dispersion 
(6) 
       
Panel A: Logistic regression of CRASHt on CEO overconfidence 
       
CEO Overconfidence 0.035 0.172** 0.126 0.208** 0.135** 0.209*** 
 (0.52) (2.16) (1.38) (2.22) (2.53) (2.68) 
       
Observations 7,546 7,550 7,200 7,212 7,200 7,212 
Pseudo-R2 0.027 0.030 0.028 0.029 0.028 0.029 
Subsample comparison 
of coefficients on CEO 
overconfidence 
 
Chi-Square = 2.10 
(P-value = 0.148) 
 
Chi-Square = 0.49 
(P-value = 0.484) 
 
Chi-Square = 0.55 
(P-value = 0.460) 
Panel B: OLS regression NCSKEWt on CEO overconfidence 
       
CEO Overconfidence 0.013 0.070*** 0.027 0.056** 0.023 0.048*** 
 (1.11) (3.85) (0.95) (2.52) (1.62) (2.94) 
       
Observations 7,595 7,594 7,248 7,247 7,248 7,247 
Adj. R2 0.029 0.040 0.032 0.040 0.032 0.041 
% Overconfident CEOs 42.3% 31.5% 16.2% 19.5% 33.1% 37.3% 
Subsample comparison 
of coefficients on CEO 
overconfidence 
 
Chi-Square = 4.32 
(P-value = 0.038) 
 
Chi-Square = 0.62 
(P-value = 0.431) 
 
Chi-Square = 0.80 
(P-value = 0.381) 
Panel C: OLS regression of  DUVOLt  on CEO overconfidence 
       
CEO Overconfidence 0.005 0.029*** 0.015 0.026** 0.013** 0.025*** 
 (0.77) (3.92) (1.22) (2.35) (1.96) (3.35) 
       
Observations 7,595 7,594 7,248 7,247 7,248 7,247 
Adj. R2 0.036 0.046 0.040 0.048 0.041 0.049 
Subsample comparison 
of coefficients on CEO 
overconfidence 
 
Chi-Square = 3.73 
(P-value = 0.053) 
 
Chi-Square = 0.44 
(P-value = 0.509) 
 
Chi-Square = 0.77 
(P-value = 0.380) 
       
Control Variables Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
% Overconfident CEOs 42.3% 31.5% 16.2% 19.5% 33.1% 37.3% 
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Table 8 
Robustness: Subsample of firms with superior performance during the CEO’s tenure 
 
Dependent Variable: CRASHt NCSKEWt DUVOLt
    
CEO Overconfidence    
OC_CJRS t-1 0.204* 0.076** 0.038** 
 (1.78) (2.37) (2.55) 
    
Control Variables    
    
DTURNOVER t-1 0.092 0.100 0.079 
 (0.19) (0.79) (1.37) 
LNCSKEWt-1 -0.160 -0.036 -0.012 
 (-1.23) (-0.89) (-0.64) 
SIGMAt-1 1.134 0.851 0.443 
 (0.48) (1.22) (1.52) 
RETt-1 -0.052 -0.019 -0.010 
 (-0.51) (-0.69) (-0.82) 
SIZEt-1 -0.078 -0.001 0.002 
 (-1.51) (-0.08) (0.32) 
MBt-1 -0.019 0.009** 0.004** 
 (-1.01) (2.15) (2.14) 
LEVt-1 0.080 -0.078 -0.021 
 (0.22) (-0.79) (-0.41) 
ROAt-1 1.329** 0.464** 0.246*** 
 (2.45) (2.20) (2.80) 
INCENTIVE_STKt-1 0.112 -0.079 -0.040 
 (0.47) (-1.32) (-1.38) 
INCENTIVE_OPTt-1 0.188 -0.031 -0.021 
 (0.51) (-0.30) (-0.40) 
OPAQUEt-1 0.316 -0.020 0.003 
 (1.18) (-0.25) (0.08) 
OPAQUEt-1* OPAQUEt-1 -0.071 0.017 0.005 
 (-0.76) (0.73) (0.47) 
Constant -1.831*** -0.714*** -0.447*** 
 (-2.76) (-7.81) (-11.59) 
% Overconfident CEOs 0.518 0.518 0.518 
Observations 2,227 2,319 2,319 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo-/Adj. R2  0.052 0.053 0.062 
 
Notes: This table reports the results of the impact of CEO overconfidence on crash risk for a subsample of good 
performance CEOs. The “good” performance is defined as a positive return that exceeds industry quartile in the past 
three years. The sample period is from 1993 to 2010. All variables are defined in the Appendix. The Z-statistics (t-
statistics) reported in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by both firm and time. Here ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
